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EU Funds, National Budget and Economy 
Georgi Angelov 
 
Recently, the European Union funds are a real 
hit. Every day the information programs of TV 
and radio stations, the issues of the newspapers 
and magazines mention at least several times the 
phrase “European funds”. In principle, there is 
nothing bad in discussing the spending and 
control over these funds. The problem is mainly 
connected to the disproportionate importance 
attached to these funds, which shows either 
insincerity, a mere willingness to impress the 
EU commission, or just a way to escape from 
the question about the efficiency of the national 
funds and resources. 
EU funds 
It is expected that between 2007 and 2013 the 
Bulgarian government will receive more than 12 
billion euro under EU programmes. Of course it 
is almost impossible, especially taking into 
account the (negative) experience of Bulgarian 
administration with EU funds, that all the funds 
will be used. Probably, no more than 80% of the 
money will be received (according to some, 
even 75% is to high expectation). 
At the same time, the Bulgarian government will 
not only receive money from EU, but it will also 
pay some money in the EU budget. These 
payments will, most probably, exceed 2 billion 
euro for the 7-year period from 2007 to 2013. 
These payments will need to be done 
irrespective of the rate of absorption of EU 
funds. 
Not least, many EU programmes must be co-
financed by the Bulgarian authorities. In other 
words, Bulgarian government budget must 
spend some money in order to receive money 
from the European funds. It is disputable 
whether the national co-financing must be 
considered (partly or totally) as expenditure and 
whether to cut the value of the net financing 
from the EU with this money. For our purposes, 
we will assume that only half of the national co-
financing is a cost. 
After all these calculations, the net amount that 
can be expected from the EU budget is about 11 
billion leva for the 7-year period. 
State budget 
In 2006, if the economy continues the current 
path of development, the revenues of the 
government budget will reach 20 billion leva. If 
we assume a moderate growth of the economy 
and inflation in the next 7 years, we can expect 
for 2007-2013 period the revenues in the budget 
to reach about 200 billion leva. 
Economy 
Without being too optimistic or pessimistic, we 
can assume that the average nominal economic 
growth in the next 7 years can be about 8.5% 
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(3.5-4.5% real growth and the same inflation). 
Under these moderate assumptions, in the next 7 
years the total produced gross domestic product 
(GDP) will be more than 450 billion leva. 
Comparative analysis 
In the best case, if we assume full absorption of 
the EU money, the Bulgarian government can 
expect 14 billion leva net financing from the EU 
for 7 years. In the more realistic case the 
financing is 11 billion leva. Therefore, whatever 
efforts are put into absorption of the EU funds, 
the maximum change that can be achieved is 3 
billion leva. Moreover, the usage of these funds 
is limited by many rules, designed to achieve the 
EU goals, therefore they cannot be invested 
where Bulgarian society desires most. 
As we showed, the government revenues for the 
same period will be about 200 billion leva, i.e. 
16 times greater than the expected EU funds. 
Taking into account the large share of inefficient 
expenditures in the budget of the Bulgarian 
administration, a more intensive policy of 
control and increasing the efficiency of 
expenditures can deliver at least 30 billion leva 
savings within 7 years. 
The total GDP in the period 2007-2013 under 
realistic assumptions about the rate of economic 
development will amount to more than 450 
billion leva. If some more radical economic 
reforms are made, the rate of economic 
development will increase by at least 4-5 
percentage points, as shows the example of other 
countries. Such a development could bring a net 
positive effect for the well being of the citizens 
amounting to more than 100 billion leva within 
the 7-year period. 
Obviously, the biggest opportunities for 
increasing the well being of Bulgarian citizens 
can be extracted from reforms, increasing the 
rate of economic growth. About three times 
lower is the effect that can be obtained through 
increasing the efficiency of government 
expenditures. The effect from putting more 
efforts in the absorption of EU funds is about 33 
times lower than the results of increasing 
economic growth and about ten times lower than 
increasing the efficiency of government budget. 
In the light of these data, the excessive accent 
put on the EU funds, is not justified. The 
greatest attention in economic debates must be 
received by the economic reforms, leading to 
higher economic growth and reforms that 
increase the efficiency of government budget. 
There is nothing bad in discussing the EU funds, 
but the accent must be predominantly on the 
economic and fiscal reforms. 
 
Comparative analysis: EU funds, national 
budget, GDP 
Leva EU funds National budget Economy (GDP)
Expected 
development 11 000 000 000 196 000 000 000 457 000 000 000
Possible 
additional 
effect as a 
result of 
reforms 
3 000 000 000 30 000 000 000 100 000 000 000
Source: Calculation by the author on the basis of 
data by AEAF, NSI, BNB, MF 
 
 
Do We Need the Compulsory Minimum 
Wage Compensation for Years in Service? 
Adriana Mladenova 
 
At the beginning of the year 2006, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised the 
question for the abolishment the mandatory 
wage bonuses in Bulgaria that are defined as a 
0.6% of the nominal wage for each additional 
year in service. The Bulgarian government took 
the commitment to abolish this regulation in 
2004 in an agreement with the IMF. The uprise 
of the question provoked a number of comments 
in Bulgaria - in media, on forums and among 
politicians. Labor unions made a firm position 
that the minimum service bonuses should not be 
abolished and they can be removed only if new 
mechanisms come into force so that the level of 
the salaries in the private and public sector can 
be regulated. In the opposite case, all working 
people will be “doomed” to low wages, they 
warn. 
The government stepped back and the social 
minister Mrs. Maslarova said that till the end of 
the year the bonuses will not be removed. This is 
hardly a wonder because the Ministry Labor and 
Social Affairs cannot afford to have its image of 
social responsibility degraded. The politicians 
preferred taking a popular decision as opposed 
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to keeping their promise before the Fund and 
making a step towards liberalization of the 
Bulgarian labor market. In policy, it is known, 
that the winning ideas are those that are 
supported by socially famous groups and 
lobbies, no matter whether they represent the 
majority of the public or whether they are 
efficient for the business. That is why it is of 
utmost importance to discuss the government’s 
decisions and comment on the economic impact 
of the policies that are being conducted. 
The Institute for Market Economics stands 
firmly behind the position that the legal 
minimum compensation should be abolished. 
However, by stating this we are not agents of the 
“greedy” employers who would rather not pay 
the employees for their work. On the contrary, 
there is a real alternative to the existing policy, 
which can lead to more disposable income for 
the people. For this purpose it is necessary (and 
possible having in mind the current fiscal 
balances) for the tax burden and the social 
security payments to be reduced and at the same 
time the labor market to be “freed” from 
regulations such as the compensation for service, 
minimum social security payments for different 
professions, etc. The low wages are only a 
consequence of the business environment and 
the current situation on the labor market, and the 
imposed administrative regulations do not lead 
to an affective change and enhanced labor 
paying. We should not treat the symptoms, but 
the disease itself. 
 
What determines the wage rates? 
Back in the middle of 19 century, one of the 
fathers of the classic school of economics – 
Frederic Bastiat – wrote the following: when two 
workers run after one employer, wages fall; they 
rise when two employers run after one worker. 
In market economics wages depend on the 
supply and demand of labor. When there is more 
demand for labor, the wages grow up and vise 
versa. This “natural law” cannot be changed, no 
matter what politicians and union leaders wish 
and want. The minimum compensation in the 
wages is just an instrument for redistribution of 
resources and as such is followed by distortions 
of the market powers, which affect the behavior 
of both employees and employers. 
Mandatory service bonuses are relics form the 
past – left from the period of communism when 
such administrative regulations were the only 
way to raise the wages to pay for experience, 
qualification and loyalty. Nowadays, all these 
factors are taken in consideration when 
employee and employers negotiate freely on the 
market and the central-planning mechanisms 
only harm workers.  
By abolishing government regulations and 
restrictions, a green light would be given to the 
market mechanisms. Individual bargaining 
between employee and employer and a human 
resource policy on a company level is the most 
efficient way of deciding on the terms of work. 
Labor is subjective and every person is unique, 
his/her capabilities cannot and should not be 
limited into stereotypes and frameworks. 
Now, lets have a look at the effects from the 
existing wage compensation from the point view 
of the employee and of the employer. 
 
Employees 
• The mandatory bonuses leave the 
feeling that not the employers but the 
state is responsible for workers and it 
should take care of its citizens. The 
desire to be paternalized from the 
government distorts the incentives and 
motivation of people. They have the 
misleading feeling of safety and are 
ready to seek their “rights” not by 
negotiating with employers but by going 
on strike or abstaining from 
participation in elections as a protest 
against the government. 
• Instead of being motivated to improve 
and advance, the artificial compensation 
works in just the opposite direction – it 
discourages many people, as these 
bonuses are a kind of certain source of 
income. Empirical studies show that 
minimum wages substantially reduce 
training received by young workers – 
both undertaken to qualify for a job or 
on-the-job training aimed at improving 
the skills. 
 
Employers 
• Some employers recruit young people 
with fewer years of professional 
experience in order to avoid paying the 
service bonuses. Unemployment among 
the elderly is still high due partly to the 
mandatory compensation. Many of the 
elderly, although having a considerable 
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number of years in service, do not 
possess some of the qualifications of the 
young such as computer literacy or the 
have a profession for which there is no 
longer a demand on the labor market. 
So, they cannot compete on equal terms 
with the young, as their years in service 
are a burden for them before employers. 
• Some employers in the private sector 
avoid the regulation by paying different 
nominal salaries to their employees so 
that the compulsory bonuses would not 
differentiate them. Some of the 
regulations for the business in the sphere 
of labor law and the fiscal burden are 
among the greatest engines of 
development of the “gray sector“ in the 
country. 
• Effective programs for motivation of the 
employees are not 0.6% annual increase 
of the gross salary for each additional 
year in service. Thus, there is no room 
even for competition among employees. 
Private companies have made up 
different ways of stimulating and 
motivating their workers such as 
bonuses driven by results, opportunities 
for personal development, creation of 
valuable business contacts, and personal 
satisfaction. Focusing of the employer 
on employees themselves, not upon the 
regulations of the state (together with 
the headache to avoid them) will help 
the workers to much greater extent. 
 
Labor market and efficiency 
The mandatory compensation in wages is not a 
solution to the problems. In economics every 
event has seen and unseen consequences – 
incentive distortions and different signals are 
sent to the market players via the prices of the 
products and the factors of production. In order 
for the wages to be increased, the productivity of 
workers should be increased and there should 
also be economic growth, which makes the 
business more optimistic about future, and 
consequentially, more labor and capital are 
hired. 
One of the arguments in favor of the compulsory 
service bonuses is that the wages are sticky. That 
means that they are not affected in the short run 
by supply and demand of labor and as such, 
addition to the nominal wages is needed to 
correct for inflation, e.g. However, the primary 
cause of the stickiness of wages is not a market 
failure. The government regulations, minimum 
wages, intervention of unions, the labour law 
make the wages sticky. Bulgaria is in the last 
places by labor mobility indicator as a result of 
the heavy bureaucracy and the great number of 
administrative measures and regulations. 
 
Regulations should be conducted only if the 
benefits from them are greater than the costs and 
the negative side effects for people. The possible 
externalities of the regulations are higher 
unemployment, decrease of the labor force, 
growing up of unofficial market. In Bulgaria the 
unemployment among the elderly people is at 
considerable rates, the labor force tends to 
reduce and the unofficial market is still a 
concern. 
 
According to a study conducted by the World 
Bank, heavier regulation of labor is associated 
with lower labor force participation and higher 
unemployment, especially of the young. 
 
Successful relations between employees and 
employers come from mutual interest, not as a 
result of compulsory mechanisms and 
government interventions. When employees 
improve their skills and qualification, their 
wages rise as they become more valuable for the 
company the work for. In this way, people 
should rely on their own capabilities. In the 
other case, if we do not trust the market itself, 
we should rely on the benevolence of the state 
and hope that the strategies the public officials 
write are efficient. Unfortunately for those who 
believe in the government to reduce poverty, the 
strategies of the central planning do not 
eradicate the problems and the implementation 
of these strategies even worsens them. 
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Establishment of State Export Bank – Does It 
Have To Be Done? 
Dimitar Chobanov 
The Sixth roundtable organized by the 
prestigious newspaper The Economist was 
conducted in March. During the discussions, the 
idea for the establishment of a new state-owned 
bank aimed at a more active and focused policy 
for promoting the Bulgarian export. The 
rationale for this suggestion was that the export 
and import should be balanced. 
It seems like the data revision has not relieved 
the authorities although the current account 
deficit was substantially lower compared to the 
previous data. According to the new 
methodology, the current account deficit was 
5.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) instead 
of 8.5% of GDP in 2004 and 11.9% of GDP 
instead of 14.9% of GDP in 2005. Resulting 
from the new methodology, the negative trade 
balance rose (from 14 to 15.2% of GDP in 2004 
as well as from 19.3% to 20.6% of GDP in 
2005) and probably has raised concerns among 
the Bulgarian government officials. 
Different ideas addressing the “issue” with the 
current account deficit were presented during the 
last few months – increasing the value added tax 
rate, introduction of import taxes and more 
comprehensive export strategies. These 
measures as well as the establishment of an 
export promotion bank would not have a real 
effect. National practice shows that different 
existing state institutions aimed to some extent 
at stimulating the export. Those are the 
Bulgarian Export Insurance Agency and the 
Encouragement Bank. However, according to 
the government officials, their functions are 
quite limited and the results are vague. 
At present, the number of licensed banks and 
branches of foreign banks in Bulgaria exceeds 
301. Apart from this, the possible accession of 
Bulgaria into the European Union would allow 
the banks licensed by the other EU members to 
operate in the country. Hence, if the rulers assess 
the banking system functioning as unsuccessful, 
                                                 
1 Licensed banks that can implement banking in the 
country and abroad are 28 and the foreign bank 
branches are 6. 
the entry of new players into the market in 
relatively short period would inevitably have a 
positive influence over the bank sector 
competition. 
The operational results of the commercial banks, 
however, do not support such doubts. Since a 
massive privatization of bank system was 
implemented, only the Encouragement Bank is 
still owned by the state and the Sofia 
Municipality owns over 50 percent of the 
Municipal Bank. Therefore, the greater share of 
the banking system is private and is owned by 
foreign investors who have experience and skills 
in banking. Thus, it is hard to believe, that banks 
operating in Bulgaria would not provide 
financing for successful projects whether they 
are directed toward the external or to the internal 
market. 
The development of banking during the last 
years shows that the credit activity has 
significantly risen. This activity has even 
induced a strong reaction by the central bank 
aimed at limiting the rate of increase of credit 
volume. According to the author’s calculations 
based on the Bulgarian National Bank data, the 
long-term credits for non-financial enterprises 
which are supposed to be the source for the 
country’s export has continuously risen since 
2001. The growth is around 71 percent in 2002, 
around 65 percent in 2003, 49 percent in 2004, 
and 31.2 percent in 2005 respectively. Apart 
from this, the interest rate on these loans has 
lowered substantially from over 13 percent in 
2001 to around 10 percent in 2005. Therefore, 
there is a strong positive development in bank 
credits. 
However, the state or any of its agencies is not 
the determinant for this tendency. The retraction 
of the state from this industry is thus proven to 
be successful and has a clear result. Of course, 
the international conjuncture should be taken 
into consideration, which also contributed to a 
large extent to the growing volume of credits. 
The other determinant is the increased 
competition among private banks as well as 
better management and information systems that 
allow processing a greater number of credit 
requests. 
In these circumstances, the government 
interference through the establishment of new 
bank looks inappropriate. There would not be an 
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effect from such a bank. It would probably be 
used for granting credits with lower than market 
interest rate for projects that would not be 
financed otherwise. Hence, the government 
would virtually lower the economic efficiency 
directing resources to such projects. This, in 
turn, would reduce the resources available for 
other projects. So, the government would 
support less productive projects at the expense 
of better ones that could be financed by already 
existing banks. 
One should not omit that the new bank would be 
capitalized with the taxpayers’ money. The 
presence of fiscal reserve account exceeding 
EUR 2 000 million is at a great value for the 
ruling majority to undertake a massive 
investment program. However, as it was already 
mentioned, the effect from these measures is 
rather populist. Their purpose is to show the 
government’s concern for a particular “problem” 
but they do not really solve it. It is also logical to 
suppose that this state-owned bank would be 
used for granting loans to companies related to 
the government officials. Hence, it is possible to 
create a situation for higher corruption. Banking 
management also would increase the number of 
palatable positions that could be divided 
between the coalition partners. 
The conclusion from the specified arguments is 
that an establishment of something unnecessary 
for the economy is suggested and the effect from 
this would not be higher export. Instead of 
establishment a new bank, the government has 
to conduct measures aimed at better business 
environment in Bulgaria. Banking is a good 
example showing that foreign and local 
investment and the competition lead to positive 
development and this is beneficial not only for 
the banks but also for the population as a whole. 
It was achieved by opposite measures like 
retraction of the state from this industry. This is 
the exact way for the rest of the economy – 
broadened liberty and less government 
interference. 
 
 
 
 
Bulgaria Real Estate Market – Exciting Past 
And Steady Future2 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
Development of the real estate market is of great 
importance to Bulgaria. The construction 
industry in the country employs a significant 
number of people, adds value to the economy 
and thus contributes to the steady GDP increase. 
On the other hand, the banking industry is more 
than ever involved in the real estate sector by 
facilitating mortgage credits to individuals and 
companies and by offering more flexible 
conditions, lower interest rates and longer terms. 
Last but not least, rapid real estate market 
development attracted huge foreign investments 
in the country, both speculative and green-field, 
that accelerated growth of the economy. 
 
What are the main factors for that? 
1) The economic environment in the 
country improved significantly in last 5 
years – we have one of the lower 
corporate rates in Europe, inflation is 
                                                 
2 This article first appeared in Sofia Echo Weekly 
newspaper. 
lower, incomes are rising, predictability 
improved, economic freedom increased. 
2) New legislation was passed that 
facilitated secondary mortgage market 
and real-estate related investments – 
introduction of a law on mortgage bonds 
in 2000 (banks can find additional 
money for their credit activities), a law 
on special purpose vehicles in 2003 
(companies that can invest in real estate 
and thus provide opportunity for small 
investors to put their money in big 
investment projects), and improvement 
of Central credit registry within the 
national bank and start of operation of 
the first private credit bureau that would 
allow for greater transparency. 
3) EU accession is anticipated as a trusted 
measure for an economy that heads to 
more stabile and secure business 
environment for investors. 
The state’s role should be to guarantee private 
property rights and contract enforcement. 
Unfortunately, we are witnessing some negative 
draft laws and intentions in this field that can 
have contradictory results. Such examples are a 
draft law on registering construction companies, 
a draft act on the seacoast, the idea to tax all 
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agricultural land in the country, etc. If these are 
to be implemented we can expect adverse effects 
on the real estate market. 
Transparency and security are very important for 
this market. The government has received 
financing from World Bank to create a property 
register and cadastre. Nevertheless, they are in 
the process of creation and delays cause 
problems and leading to a less liquid market. 
The obstacle for a more transparent market is 
misreporting of the transfer price in real estate 
deals. The incentives of hiding are two – due 
transfer tax (2%) and informal economy (all 
deals above 30 000 BGN should be reported 
before the Financial Intelligence Agency for 
origin of money and this is hard in case you 
misreported your income because of high social 
security contributions for example). 
Despite all of these circumstances, the property 
market in Bulgaria has accumulated enormous 
foreign flows in real estate – starting from 4.7 
mln. euro in 2000 and reaching 335.8 mln. euro 
in 2005. These developments have made people 
wealthier and provided good investment 
opportunities. 
 
Major real estate market developments in 2005 
and future prospects 
Housing market – after the most successful 
year (2004), 2005 was characterized by steady 
housing construction, higher prices, friendly 
banks and willing customers. Although, price 
inflation was less aggressive, we witnessed 
increased prices in several secondary markets in 
the country (Stara Zagora, Pleven, Blagoevgrad, 
etc.) as a result of catching up with business 
development. 2006 will be less profitable for 
construction entrepreneurs (more time to sell 
finished apartments, demand for more flexible 
payment schemes so to be competitive, higher 
quality demanded by customers, increased land 
price). 
Vacation (apartment) buildings – the boom in 
construction of such buildings was dominant in 
2004 - 2005 with major destinations summer 
resorts (Sunny Beach, Golden Sands), as well as 
winter destinations (Bansko, Pamporovo). Bad 
infrastructure, lack of commitment and control 
from local municipalities is on its way to turn 
these places into overbuilt cities where no decent 
return from investment can be achieved. That is 
why, one should be careful when considering 
investing money into this. Anyway, other 
destinations inside the country gather 
momentum and are likely to be very profitable 
and attractive. 
Land – one of the major characteristics of land 
market in Bulgaria is the existing ban of 
foreigners to acquire land in the country. 
However, this is not considered as an obstacle 
but increases transaction cost, time for 
concluding a deal and involves intermediaries. 
In any case, this gives the chance for many low 
class families to sell their land at higher price. 
We can hardly say that there is a dynamic land 
market in Bulgaria except for big cities and 
resorts where major construction activity is 
concentrated. Agricultural land is still less 
attractive. Despite this, several specialized land 
investment funds were created so we believe that 
this market is just starting its real development. 
Still, land investment will require long-term 
commitment and is less liquid. 
Office market – starting to be very dynamic in 
the capital and expected to be of greater 
attention for investors. “Specialized” in such 
investments are special purpose investment 
companies that accumulate funds from smaller 
investors, invest them in big projects and 
manage the property for number of years. Since 
demand for specialized, high-quality office 
buildings with additional services is accelerating 
we can expect that many entrepreneurs will be 
attracted in this segment. Since more and more 
companies are willing to build their own offices 
and then sell and lease back we can expect 
future development. 
Industrial market – it is concentrated in several 
areas in the country (Sofia, Plovdiv, Sevlievo, 
Bourgas) but more cities are making efforts to 
attract big companies. Accelerating the 
decentralization process in Bulgaria will give 
powers to local municipalities to offer 
competitive business environment and stimulate 
new investments. The process however is slower 
than desired. Land prices, the urbanization 
process and local authorities willingness to assist 
business are deemed as incentives for big 
foreign companies to invest. 
Trade market – every time an economy is 
growing trade properties are on the edge of 
investors’ interest. With rising incomes, the 
consumer confidence and purchasing power are 
increasing and this inevitably rises spending. 
2005 was the year when several big trade centers 
were started and expected to be completed in 
2006. The so-called malls are registering huge 
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investors interest and all units are pre-sold 
entirely. Sofia, Varna, Stara Zagora are the cities 
that attracted such projects. 
Property as an investment – price inflation of 
all types of property (except for land) turned real 
estate investment into a very profitable 
endeavor. Bulgaria was among the few countries 
in Europe that secured a property investment 
return of above 9% - 10% in 2005. The picture is 
changing slowly in downward direction but is 
still attractive for investors. Lower levels of 
European interest rates attract less speculative 
investors as ordinary foreign citizens and 
companies. The trend however is for steady 
flattening of Bulgaria’s property returns with 
European levels in next 3-4 years. 
Sofia – capital property market should be 
analyzed separately from other locations since it 
differs in many ways. First, housing demand is 
more dynamic and constant that is due to in-
country migration, higher incomes, 
headquarters’ location of almost all international 
companies, good investment prospects, etc. That 
is why housing prices rose permanently with the 
changing of preferred districts in time. Central 
locations are still of interest but high-quality 
residential complexes with restricted access in 
the outskirts of the city are attracting customers. 
They offer European quality construction, 
additional services, property management, 
security and comfort to its buyers. At the 
moment, wealthy people are among the major 
customers but we are witnessing a change in 
customers profile since middle-class buyers are 
supported by banks in such transactions. Office 
buildings in Sofia are soon to become the most 
attractive type of construction. EU accession and 
positive expectations of business facilitate 
investment in real estate for their activities. 
Although rents lagged behind in 2004 and 2005, 
we see an increase of their levels that should 
continue in 2006 if no major political downturns 
happen. Construction of two malls and a lack of 
free trade space are no surprise. 
As a summary we expect that the real estate 
market will further develop with less intensity in 
its housing and vacation apartments sectors, and 
with a future focus in office and land segments. 
 
 
An Aide Memoire on the Perils of 
Protectionism 
Kevin P. Allen 
 
Shakespeare once said: “That which we call 
economic patriotism by any other words would 
smell as sweet.” Perhaps those were not his 
exact words but irrespective, his premise was 
correct. Protectionist policies employed by 
European countries as of recent do indeed smell 
although sweet is probably not the best adjective 
that could be used to describe the smell. 
In Europe, particularly in the energy sector, 
economic nationalism (read protectionism) 
seems to be on the rise. For example, the recent 
EUR 72 billion merger between the French 
energy companies Gaz de France and Suez has 
brought criticism allegations of government 
interference from the Italian government. The 
Italians argue that the union between the French 
companies was designed to hinder a potential 
hostile takeover on behalf of the Italian firm 
Enel SpA. The French government, which now 
owns approximately 35% of the new company, 
argues that they are not endorsing protectionist 
policies but rather promoting ‘economic 
patriotism’. 
Further examples of such policies can be found 
in Spain and Luxembourg, among other places. 
In Spain, the power company Endesa rejected a 
EUR 29.1 billion bid by German firm E.ON 
suggesting that the bid did not ‘adequately 
reflect the true value of Endesa.’3 The bid 
proved to be disconcerting to the Spanish 
government who sought to obstruct the merger 
via the invocation of a 1999 Spanish law that 
gives authorities the right to block companies in 
which a public body has an interest from taking 
a stake exceeding 3.0 percent in a Spanish 
energy company.4The European Commission 
has proposed that Spain be brought before the 
European Court of Justice for its’ actions. 
Protectionism again reared its ugly head when 
Indian steel company5 Mittal Steel, the world’s 
largest steel producer, attempted to takeover 
Arcelor with a EUR 18.6 billion bid. The 
                                                 
3 www.uk.biz.yahoo.com  
4 “EU to sue Spain over ‘illegal’ energy merger 
blocking law – www.zeenews.com.  
5 Although Mittal Steel is an Indian owned firm, it is 
registered in the Netherlands and is therefore bound 
by E.U. regulations. 
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government of Luxembourg, who owns a 5.6 
percent share in Arcelor, responded by asserting 
that the ‘hostile bid by Mittal Steel calls for a 
reaction that is at least as hostile.’6 The reaction 
consisted of passing legislation which would 
make it easier to fend off unwanted takeovers. In 
response India’s commerce minister, Kamal 
Nath, has argued that opposition to the takeover 
is the result of racial discrimination and has 
gone out of his way to remind E.U. members of 
their WTO obligations. 
I could go on and discuss how the government 
of Poland sought to disrupt a merger involving 
Italian banking leviathan Unicredit and 
Germany’s HVB bank but the point has been 
made relatively clear:  Europe is witnessing a 
resurgence in protectionist policies. 
While one could make the argument that efforts 
to protect national interests are carried out in 
concern for the state and its people, the bottom 
line is that such behavior is diametric to the E.U. 
notion of a free and open market and counter-
productive in the context of international trade. 
Economic nationalism is not in the best interest 
of governments or consumers as it has the 
potential to: 
- Diminish the potential value of firms. 
The Economist7 reported increased deal 
activity (roughly 50%) in all major 
European markets in 2005. In the form 
of mergers and acquisitions, this 
increased activity is, at least in part, a 
function of corporate profits. 
Government intervention retards the 
economic growth of corporations and 
devalues stocks owned by shareholders. 
- Lead to sub-optimal performance. By 
barring productive firms from acquiring 
those that are less productive, economic 
nationalism leads to sub-optimal 
corporate performance. Efficient firms 
are efficient because they eliminate 
stagnant and unproductive components 
of the firms they acquire. 
- Diminish foreign direct investment. 
When national governments interfere in 
private business deals, foreign 
companies become reluctant to invest. 
Undoubtedly, situations such as the ones 
in Spain and in Luxembourg will push 
                                                 
6 “India reminds EU of WTO obligations in steel 
battle.” – www.euobserver.com  
7 “Europe’s nascent merger boom” – 9/3/2005 
firms to look toward more liberal 
markets for investment opportunities. 
- Inadvertently lead to increased 
unemployment. For example, in the 
early 1980’s the United States placed 
import quotas on the auto industry. As a 
result, the average price of an 
automobile rose almost 41% over 4 
years.8 Although the goal was to save 
American jobs, the higher prices of 
automobiles led to significantly 
decreased sales and consequently, 
numerous job cuts in the auto industry. 
- Distort prices. Tariffs, subsidies, and 
non-tariff barriers ultimately result in 
higher prices for goods and services. 
One need only look to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) for an 
example as E.U. consumers are paying 
roughly twice as much for their food as 
they would without the CAP.9 
After delineating some of the negative aspects of 
economic nationalism, it seems judicious to 
reiterate some of the advantages associated with 
free trade. In this context the term free trade is 
used to identify trade policies free of any form 
of government interference. 
The most obvious advantage of free trade can be 
seen in the form of economic growth. Data 
from developing nations  (between 1970 and 
1990) shows that countries with open trade 
policies registered a 4.5% growth rate while 
those with closed borders registered a growth 
rate of only 1%. During the same period, the 
GDP of the open countries grew by an average 
of 2.3% while the GDP of the “closed” countries 
grew by only 0.7%.10 To use the United States as 
an example, a University of Michigan study 
shows lowering global trade barriers on all 
products and services by even one-third could 
boost the U.S. economy by $177 billion, thereby 
raising living standards for the average family 
by $2,500 annually.11 
Another advantage of free trade is that it creates 
jobs. While some might argue that such policies 
result in the loss of American jobs, evidence 
from the North American Free Trade Agreement 
                                                 
8 “The Myths and Realities of Trade Protectionism.” - 
www.heritage.org  
9 “A New Agenda for European Agriculture: A 
Radical Proposal.” – www.timbro.se  
10 “The Benefits of Free Trade.” – www.ncpa.org.   
11  “International Trade.” – www.whitehouse.gov  
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(NAFTA) suggests otherwise. Opponents of free 
trade argued that the implementation of NAFTA 
would result in the massive loss of blue-collar 
jobs in America however since its inception 
more than 14 million new American jobs have 
been created, unemployment has fallen from 6% 
to 3.9%, and the number of manufacturing jobs 
in the U.S. has remained stable at roughly 18.4 
million*. 
As well, free trade promotes innovation and 
competition. By encouraging competition, free 
trade of goods and services forces companies to 
be innovative and create better products for 
lower prices in order to retain their market share. 
One example of the benefits of competition can 
be seen in the airline industry. In 1975, the 
airline industry carried about 200 million 
passengers where as currently the industry 
carries almost 600 million passengers a year.  
Free trade also fosters the strengthening of 
infrastructure while helping to develop of a 
variety of institutions. Infrastructure 
development comes via the construction and 
maintenance of ports, airports, and highways 
while institutional growth can be seen in the 
expansion of the banking, financial, and 
insurance sectors. Free trade also reinforces the 
rule of law as in order to enforce contracts and 
protect transport vessels, trading countries must 
have stable police forces as well as strong 
judicial systems. 
Some analysts and scholars argue that free trade 
promotes peace. Erich Weede, of the University 
of Bonn, contends that a number of quantitative 
studies provide evidence of a causal chain 
running from free trade via prosperity and 
democracy to the avoidance of military conflict. 
Citing research by prominent political scientists 
such as Susan Stokes, Carles Boix, and Seymour 
Lipset, Weede argues that ‘trade underwrites 
democracy and thereby the democratic peace 
where it prevails.’ One cannot extricate free 
trade from democracy and it would be remiss to 
completely ignore the relationship between free 
trade, democracy, and peace. 
These are just a few of the obvious benefits 
resulting from free and open trade practices. 
Most industrialized nations engage in 
protectionist policies at one point or another 
however the recent upsurge in economic 
nationalism in Europe is cause for concern as it 
has the potential to become self-perpetuating. 
The appropriate course of action would be to 
recognize and accept the fact that, in an 
economic context, the world is shrinking quite 
rapidly and ‘economic patriotism’ ultimately 
does more harm than good. There is no longer 
room in the global economy for countries such 
as France to endorse takeovers when French 
companies like Vivendi Universal buy out 
foreign firms such as Seagram and Houghton 
Mifflin and then later reverse their position 
when a foreign firm such as PepsiCo seeks to 
takeover Danone. The pitfalls of protectionist 
policies are well known however it has become 
quite apparent that they can sometimes be 
forgotten. Thus I give to you this brief reminder. 
---------- 
* “The Benefits of Free Trade: A Guide for 
Policymakers.” – www.heritage.org  
** “Why America Needs to Support Free Trade.” – 
www.heritage.org. 
** “The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by 
Globalization.” – www.independent.org. 
 
 
Social Responsibility and Business Success 
Are terms contradictory or their co-existence is 
by all means possible? 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
Probably most of the answers would turn out to 
be positive. Anyway, the mechanisms that would 
be involved in explaining the connection 
between social responsibility and business 
success would be different, possibly, differing 
from each other significantly. I would like to call 
the attention to the main, in fact, diametrically 
opposed approaches: 
• Pro-market: Successful businesses (e.g. 
companies, undertakings), even if they 
do not aim to inevitably fulfill a social 
function by making following 
contributions: creation of working 
places, paying taxes and employers’ 
insurance, striving for producing goods 
and services with higher quality at lower 
prices. That is a perpetually working 
mechanism on a natural basis. 
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• Socialist: Main role of the government is 
to carry out social programs (many 
activities are not defined as “social 
programs” but in fact they are), 
redistribute wealth and thus fulfill social 
functions.  
But it costs something and since 
governments do not create money12 and at 
the same time have the authority to tax and 
collect money, they need to take it away 
from someone. Thus you cannot get 
something from someone who does not have 
it or has not produced it, you must take it 
from those who have worked for it – 
successful businesses or successful workers. 
Imagine you were the government; 
afterwards you can redistribute the collected 
money and direct it to wherever you think is 
appropriate. According to the socialist 
approach that is the very just co-existence 
between social responsibility and successful 
business. The more money is taken away 
and ready to be “invested” in sociality, the 
better. Here that is to be accomplished on an 
unnatural, compulsory basis. 
One of the many ways to fulfill a social function 
according to the socialist ideology is subsidizing 
state companies, i.e. covering losses they have 
produced over the year with money from the 
state or municipal budget. A typical case here 
has always been the Bulgarian State Railways 
(BSR).  
 
How is the company doing? 
For the firs three quarters of 2005 BRS have 
incurred losses of over EUR 13 million13, which 
is about EUR 4 million higher than the same 
period of 2004. Over the past three years the 
company has suffered financial losses of over 
EUR 50 million.  
Short-term liabilities exceed by over EUR 37 
million the short-term assets – company 
undergoes a serious liquidity crises. The owned 
capital of BSR as a percentage of its assets is 
slightly over 3 %, i.e. the company does not 
dispose of its own resources and is working on 
credit. Paying back the principal and interests 
would additionally burden it and lower the profit 
(if there should be any profit at all) or increase 
                                                 
12 In narrow sense, solely banks create money. It is 
about the creation of additional value, wealth. 
13 Source: BSR’s website - www.bdz.bg  
losses – respectively the money that has to be 
taken away from the budget to prevent company 
going bankrupt. 
 
What are the tendencies in provided services? 
Over the past 15 years (1990-2005) the number 
of passengers has decreased by over 67 %, 
covered kilometers, by over 70 %. For the same 
period there has been a similar drop in  hauled 
loads – 68 % and covered kilometers have 
dwindled by over 63 %.  
Over the last decade the company has been 
shrinking by an average 4-5 % annually, which 
is a clear indicator that customers are no longer 
attracted to provided services at that quality and 
price. We believe that there are no preconditions 
for achieving a breakthrough and an upward 
trend. 
Anyway, there is a positive sign: BSR are no 
longer going to cross-subsidize the 
transportation of passengers by using resources 
of the still financially sustainable part of the 
company dealing with hauling loads. It is a step 
in the right direction – towards market-oriented 
decisions of the management. Thus, if there are 
no passengers to buy tickets, but firms willing to 
buy transportation of their loads, the latter would 
probably get a service higher in quality if the 
company reinvests part of the profit in 
improving the respective capacity and facilities. 
Although this is a step in the right direction, it 
does very little to solve the main problem – the 
company is owned by the state and is being 
managed more or less by government decisions. 
In addition, accumulated losses will be further 
covered by the state budget. 
We expect that in future the company will 
continue losing capital, while the management 
policy within the company would probably 
remain the same and unnecessary expenditures, 
not directly connected to the company’s profile 
would not be cut off. For example BSR are 
maintaining: 
- 3 sea-based rest homes  
- 5 mountain-based rest homes 
- 2 sanatoriums 
 
Holding up expenditures like these would 
definitely not help the company out of the 
financial crises, much rather the opposite – will 
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deepen it. That would not be so bothering if the 
company was a private property and the 
responsibility for potential losses was fully to 
bear by and at the expenses of its private owners. 
In the case of BSR, the government should sell 
its shares and totally withdraw from the 
transportation sector, which is and will keep 
growing even faster with at least one more 
private player, which could be the privatized 
BSR of today. 
The fulfillment of social responsibilities will be 
then transferred to where it belongs and carried 
out on a natural basis. 
 
Gypsy Contribution to Prosperity in 
Bulgaria’s Late Communist Era 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
Introduction 
The key difficulty today in the EU and in 
Bulgaria’s thinking about Gypsies is that almost 
nobody things of them as normal individuals. 
They are perceived by different government and 
Brussels programs as, on one hand, “betrayed 
and oppressed” (in the human rights rhetoric), 
“isolated”, “ostracized“, “segregated”, 
“discriminated” or as, on the other hand – by left 
and “right” alike, “rough”, “stealing”, “under-
culture”, “non-civilized” and even “not-subject-
to-civilization”, to refer just to a few of the 
Bulgaria public opinions, somewhat subtitled 
clichés. 
Respectively, the required policy “towards 
them” should be one of “inclusion”, 
“integration”, “rehabilitation”, “support”, 
“education” and “protection”. This is the vision 
of the said programs, including private and 
quasi-government, UN and EU charities. The 
common denominator of all these definitions is 
taking Gypsies, or Roma as a class, as category 
of the population but not as individuals. 
Alternatively and again reading Roma as a class, 
although not quite politically correct, a part, a 
minority part – to say the truth, of the public 
opinion in Bulgaria14, Czech Republic, Slovakia 
                                                 
14 Putting Bulgaria first is no accident or alphabetical 
order of countries.  Bulgaria has the largest share of 
Gypsies in the citizenry, perhaps, around 7-8% of the 
population, and it has a party represented in the 
legislature that campaigned with a slogan (among 
other slogans) “Gypsies – on Saturn!”, which in 
Bulgaria sound like “Gypsies – on Soap!”.  (The 
word for “soap” in Bulgarian is “sapun” – from 
Turkish; so, when “Saturn” shouted sounds as 
“soap”.)  In reality, according to anthropologists and 
sociologists – Bulgaria anthropologists are really very 
good by any scientific standard, especially on 
and Serbia or Kosovo believes that Roma are the 
societal “bad guys”, those who steal, who are per 
se criminal, relief seekers, welfare users and 
basically under-class and under-dogs.  But this 
thinking too takes Gypsies as a group, ethnic 
entity or a class; and the feature prescribed to the 
groups would be immediately applicable to 
individual Roma, whatever he or she does. 
I can deliberate only on the Role of the Gypsies 
in Bulgaria.  In the three parts of this paper I will 
make an attempt to discuss how representatives 
of the Roma contributed to the prosperity under 
Communism, how they helped create Capitalism 
(a role that stems from Communist times) and 
what was and still is the role of Roma in shaping 
Bulgaria’s democracy, culture and policies. I 
start here with the late Bulgaria Communist 
years, reviewing some exclusive benefits no one 
in the country could supply but Roma 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Second hand clothing and cooperative 
agriculture  
Before 1980, the city Roma craftsmanship were 
rather typical: blacksmiths, chimney-cleaners 
and specialists in repairing lead and non-ferrous 
metals articles. Old Gypsy men, however, had an 
unique profession – they were purchasers of 
second hand clothing, wandering around towns’ 
better off neighborhoods on weekend mornings, 
shouting “Old Cloths ‘Buying”. 
In those years the second hand clothing 
exchange was functioning only among relatives; 
in Bulgaria, almost like everywhere, they used to 
                                                                         
Gypsies – the Roma in the country are very different: 
few them are nomads, many are Muslim, quite many 
but somewhat less are Protestant (in the biggest but 
not only in the large cities) and or Catholic – located 
en mass in few regions, and some are Greek, perhaps 
Vlachos or ancient Romanians, blond and 
specializing as sheep breeders.  Altogether there are 
eight distinguished groups of Roma in Bulgaria, 
distinguishable in culture, habits, religion and 
appearance. 
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exchange baby and kids’ dress. Those were 
times of widespread shortages. Re-making adult 
clothing was still somewhat popular, but that 
was the market for professional tailors while 
many people, not female but male, including 
myself, were capable of performing simple 
tailoring and had respective sewing machines at 
home. 
The very old clothing, however, that was in 
demand among Gypsies only; no one would give 
cash for that in the 70’s and the 80’s of the last 
century. 
In the 1990’s, selling second hand clothing had 
become a formalized and even international 
business. 
As far as I could recall,15 in the agriculture 
nomad Gypsies were welcome seasonal 
workforce. The eagerness of cooperative farms 
to hire them was motivated by the chronic 
shortage of farm workers, especially because 
pupils and students were creating more mess that 
value added in the fields and gardens. There was 
no discrimination: the day pay was equal to the 
normal one, the difference between urban 
“brigadiers” and the Roma was that the latter 
could work and actually worked hard, to support 
the family. 
 
Early birds of market economy 
Management of independent supply channels of 
forged or smuggled goods in time of shortages, 
however, was the true employment for the city 
Gypsies in the late of the 1970’s Bulgaria and 
the capital city of Sofia in particular. 
It was preceded by the liberalization of 
movement of people in ex-Yugoslavia (after 
1965) and the spontaneous open-air market f or 
consumer goods and fashion articles at Sofia St. 
Alexander Nevski Cathedral Square, the very 
heart of the downtown area. Yugoslavs were 
trading those articles, music plates and 
magazines, erotic journals and anything one 
would imagine or desire. That market expanded 
during the World Communist Youth Festival of 
1968, which took place two – three weeks before 
Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia. 
Suddenly, it practically declined and moved to 
                                                 
15 My Western friends may not know that in my and 
other Communist countries big, virtually all groups of 
urban populace was required to “|volunteer” few days 
or a week per annum to work in the agriculture; pupil 
and students “volunteered” at least a month. 
another location in 1972 when Belgrade and Nis 
(a town in Eastern Serbia) bus stop was moved 
to the outskirts of the city. 
On the Alexander Nevski Square “black 
market”- as it was called then although it was 
virtually the only normal market place in town, 
the Roma did not compete with Bulgarian 
spontaneous merchants who wanted to buy and 
resell to the local thirsty public; they wanted to 
sell to ex-Yugoslavs things that were much 
cheaper (subsidized) in Bulgaria – milk and milk 
products, cheese, etc.  The Roma were saving 
the ex-Yugoslavs the costs of walking around 
empty shops, of queuing and other unpleasant 
experiences. 
 
Gypsy foreign exchange 
How only very few would remember that in the 
Communist countries there were special shops 
where foreigners, tourist, diplomats and 
privileged domiciles alike could spend their hard 
currency. In Bulgaria they were called 
“Korecom” – from “currency commerce”, thus 
indicating that local “money” was anything else 
but currency. 
The supply channels of valuable goods managed 
by Roma entrepreneurs merged in relation to 
“Korecoms” and paralleled them. They 
flourished and prospered especially after the 
“Korecom’s” liberalization of 1977 that 
consisted in the fact that the government 
suddenly stopped asking questions about where 
the public has the hard currency from. Of course, 
nothing was certain but, obviously, the 
Communist planners needed dollars, D-marks 
and every other useful cash for the big ideas they 
had and it was easier to collect from the public 
than borrow through official channels. 
The circumstances were the following: 
• The fear of visiting those shops16 did not 
disappear; many people, however, were 
trying their best to overcome it; 
• The demand for hard currency had risen; 
the official exchange rate to the US 
dollar was about 1:1 but on the free 
market it was 3-4 to 1, often higher for 
                                                 
16 Beside “Korecoms” there were shop chains for 
those who possessed Russian ruble denominated 
coupons (those who worked in the Soviet Union) and 
shop for sailors, but in those shops buyer were 
required to identify themselves or source of the 
money – not always but often. 
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Soviet Union (the shortages there were 
much more severe and unbearable) 
and/or for smaller quantities; 
• An organized but informal market for 
goods demanded against hard currency 
emerged. 
The Sofia Gypsy community services in this 
situation were very much the ones at a state of 
the art:  
• Forex trading; 
• Import of most demanded goods – jeans, 
cloths, cosmetics, modest and easy to 
carry devises lime radio, tape recorders, 
gramophones, sewing machines, skis 
and ski boots, etc.; 
• Diversifying the intermediation 
depending the conjecture and the good 
at demand; 
• Visiting the shop for instead of the 
frustrated buyer. 
The money markets were located in front of the 
“Korecom” shops to serve desperate shopping 
public or smartly downtown, in front of the 
Central Department Store – next to the Council 
of Ministers building and across the square from 
the president’s office. It was rather clever to 
meet disappointed customers of the Central 
Department Store when they walk out empty-
handed and offer them some alternative to buy 
what they wished. 
The currency trader would usually ask what the 
good the unfortunate needs to buy is. If it was 
clothing, jeans or any other of the above said 
goods, the Roma entrepreneur would usually 
offer a better price than the official currency 
shop if it was to be bought at another location”. 
If it was skis or something that would be 
relatively difficult and risky to store, the service 
would be to buy that rather expensive piece at 
the hard currency shop instead of the customer 
but in his/here presence to help with his or her 
fear of being asked about the origination of the 
hard currency. 
 The ”other place” used usually to be the Gypsy 
neighborhood at the outskirts of the city, the taxi 
(another good subject to severe shortage then) 
was readily available, often at the expense of the 
seller. The goods were usually stored in a 
relatively well-to-do house. The quality was 
expected to be the same as in “Korecom” and 
one could try the cloths that were properly 
packed and labeled. The taxi would save time to 
go there and back, if the purchase was 
significant and the company pleasant the 
merchant would pay the taxi. The transaction 
should be executed in hard currency, which 
usually was to be exchanged at the separate 
vendors. 
I am not aware of a single case of fraud. In 
comparison to the trade in the “Korecoms” and 
especially to the exchanging money on the street 
with Bulgarians, the risk was zero. The militia in 
front of the Central Department Store would 
witness what was going on but would not 
interfere. The Roma vendor would, as a rule, 
know the cap. 
 
Servicing the customer 
In all three cases there is one very significant 
role of the Roma entrepreneur: he (women were 
not involved) was helping to overcome severe 
shortage of the Bulgaria’s Communist economy. 
In the shortage economies witness a very 
widespread phenomenon, the consumer surplus 
was driving the prices like in normal economies 
but with some excesses.  
Thanks to the controls and oppressed 
competition, the consumers valued some goods 
far beyond their price under other, normal 
conditions. That price paid would appear high 
relative to the opportunity costs or compared the 
wages and income. 
Some examples: in 1977-1979 a pair of jeans in 
“Korecom” could typically cost from 21 to 27 
US dollars and the price was equal to 1/5 – 1/4 
of the average salary. But outside “Korecom” the 
jeans price would be most likely 35 – 40 US 
dollars. With the Gypsy jeans vendor the pair 
price was equal to the one in the shop or often a 
little bit less. The same was the case with other 
desired goods. 
In other countries, the constellation was similar 
but there were no Gypsies involved in the trade. 
In some countries it was even more desperate 
but provided for normally unthinkable arbitrage. 
In Leningrad, today’s St. Petersburg, the price of 
a pair of jeans in 1977 – 1979 was 125 US 
dollars – almost two times the average salary. In 
the Soviet city of Tolliatti one could sell a pair 
for US 250 dollars. It was four times the average 
salary but two times the average wage in that 
city since it was producing Lada – for those who 
do not know, it was the Soviet car being sold 
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throughout the countries of the Eastern Block. 
But the circumstances could endlessly differ in 
details. For some reason, in 1975, Leningrad 
authorities banned Finnish tourists of using their 
own currency in bars and the Soviet analogue of 
“Korecoms”, limiting also the amount they could 
exchange officially. Poor Fins could exchange 
their money at 0.25 of the rate they would 
otherwise get on the unsuppressed market. Then, 
in Finnish currency, perfectly usable on the hard 
currency market in Bulgaria and elsewhere, the 
pair of jeans could cost in fact about US 7-94 
dollars and be sold in Leningrad or Tolliatti. 
In 1960’s and 1970’s people were not looking 
just for bread and butter but for something more, 
beyond the established and planned basic needs. 
How did the Gypsy entrepreneurs used to fall in 
the picture? They served the consumer. Many 
Bulgarian students in Soviet universities, 
actually thousands of them, lived better than 
many ordinary Soviets and Bulgarian for years. 
 
Contribution to prosperity 
The Gypsy entrepreneurs have been helping 
ordinary Bulgarian citizens for years doing what 
the system was not providing or was even 
fighting against. 
In the described three cases we have obviously 
dealt with: 
1. Exploring and developing a market for 
goods and services for which even an 
attempt by the majority representative 
would have been punishable or morally 
condemned but which allowed Gypsies 
help others in receiving what they 
wanted; 
2. This activity had nothing to do with the 
social welfare system of that era and the 
Gypsies involved were helping 
themselves much better compared to 
what they could have gotten under the 
welfare; 
3. Not only the flexibility of income but 
also the mobility of labor was secured 
under Communism with the Gypsy 
assistance.  It was especially visible in 
the agriculture; 
4. Being an intermediary or an 
entrepreneur was a crime during the 
Communism, Gypsies obviously 
managed to counteract the ban and serve 
the consumer surplus of many 
individuals, whose rights as customers 
were systematically oppressed by the 
government. 
Needless to say, in all three cases these activities 
were performed not only by Gypsies. The 
important point, however, is that they were 
doing this on a more massive scale and as a 
profession. There would be no exaggeration to 
state that in the Communist Bulgaria of 1970-
1980’s it was the single largest segment of the 
population that was living in and intermediating 
niches of the free market under oppression of the 
central planning.
 
 
 
 
IME Awarded  2006 Templeton Freedom Award 
 
In February 2006, the Institute for Market Economics was recognized as a winner 
of a 2006 Templeton Freedom Award Grant out of over 80 institute applications 
from all over the world. 
The Templeton Freedom Awards is a program run by Atlas Foundation (www.atlasusa.org) that rewards 
thinks tanks that are making the greatest contributions for promoting freedom as well as those with the 
most future promise. 
IME’s Economic Policy Review won the prize because: 
1. It has been pioneering public debate of topics and issues of immediate or long tem concern such 
as: first surveys of transaction costs, informal labor and informal economy in Bulgaria and the 
Balkans, on mortgages, business environment and costs of dealing with the government; 
2. Over 200 draft laws and regulations were assessed in the bulletin; 
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3. The average reprinting rate of the newsletter is 80% for 2005 and we expect it to pass 90% in 
2006 as it is gaining popularity. 
4. It disseminated methods of basic economics and cost-benefit analysis; 
5. The Economic Policy Review produces supporting materials for other IME websites and print 
product, e.g.: the EU accession sub-page (the most visited part of the IME Web), the educational 
page of the Economics Access Station of Internet (www.easibulgaria.org), the flat tax bulletin and 
the website (www.ime.bg/flat, the monthly bulletin goes to the desk of every MP and a minister), 
the cost-benefit analysis (www.ria-studies.net), the web page of mortgage finance and real estate 
(www.ceemortgagefinance.org and its more popular Bulgarian version), the sub-page on welfare 
reforms, etc. 
6. We have introduced to the Bulgarian audience via EPR and EASI a great number of unknown 
economists and writers, some of them have already become relatively popular, e.g. Bastiat, von 
Hayek, Menger, von Mises17, Curzon-Prize, Lee, Gwartney, Stroup, Swanepool, Pejovic, Paul 
Belien and others, to mention just a few. 
7. We were the first to publish the Magna Carta in Bulgarian, and via EPR highlighted topics of 
economic history. 
8. EPR had made IME associates very popular. This helped some of them successfully run for 
parliament with one colleague during the 2005 parliamentary elections being the most televised, 
interviewed and printed candidate (entering politics anew and being more popular with the media 
than former PMs, finance ministers, and the like). 
9. There are more than 3,000 e-mail addresses subscribed to the Economic Policy Review in 
Bulgarian. The traffic of the sub-page of the bulletin (http://ime-bg.org/pr_bg/) amounts to an 
average of 5,000 visitors per week. Thus, the circulation of the newsletter exceeds many of the 
established daily newspapers in the country. The newsletter is extensively quoted and cited by 
journalists, economists, and broadcasters. 
 
Dear Readers of IME materials, 
If you would like to be a part of economic freedom dissemination in Bulgaria and the world, and help elaboration 
and advocacy of market-based solutions to challenges citizens of Bulgaria and the region face, you can support the 
Institute for Market Economics by making a donation for: 
1) An article – 100 BGL 
2) The new book “Low Taxes in Bulgaria” – 250 BGL 
3) IME bulletins – 500 BGL 
4) IME WebPages - www.easibulgaria.org, www.ria-studies.net, www.competitiveness.bg - 500 BGL 
5) IME Mission – over 500 BGL 
If you are paying taxes in Bulgaria, 83% of the donation is tax-deductible. For more information please write to 
svetlak@ime.bg. 
 
                                                 
17 At the time we published them, there were no translations in Bulgarian. 
